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People v. Harnett
I.	INTRODUCTION

“[A] guilty plea is a grave and solemn act to be accepted only with care and
discernment . . . .”1 When an individual pleads guilty to a crime, they are waiving
several constitutional rights: the right against self-incrimination, the right to a trial
by jury, and the right to confront one’s accusers.2 As a result, due process requires
that guilty pleas “not only must be voluntary but must be knowing, intelligent acts
done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely
consequences.”3
A trial court must therefore guarantee that before pleading guilty the defendant
has a full understanding of the plea and its consequences.4 New York has defined the
extent of the court’s obligation according to a categorical analysis.5 Drawing a
distinction between direct and collateral consequences, New York requires courts to
inform defendants of only direct consequences.6 This approach promotes finality and
efficiency in the plea bargaining process, yet can ignore the caution with which a
plea agreement should be handled.7
In People v. Harnett, the New York Court of Appeals held that provisions of the
Sex Offender Management and Treatment Act (SOMTA), which can result in civil
confinement beyond a defendant’s prison sentence, are collateral consequences.8 As a
result, the Court of Appeals determined that a trial court was under no obligation to
inform the defendant of such consequences arising from a guilty plea.9 However, this
case comment contends that the court’s use of New York’s rigid categorical approach
failed to protect the defendant’s due process rights given the unique and harsh
consequences of SOMTA and the fact that they cannot be squarely classified as
either direct or collateral.10 The Court of Appeals should instead have analyzed
whether the possibility of civil confinement under SOMTA was so severe a
1.

Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970) (recognizing the extensive protections guarding guilty
pleas while upholding defendant’s guilty plea as valid).

2.

Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969) (holding guilty plea invalid where trial record lacked
confirmation of defendant’s knowledge and voluntariness); U.S. Const. amend. V (right against selfincrimination); U.S. Const. amend. VI (right to trial by impartial jury and right to confront adversarial
witnesses).

3.

Brady, 397 U.S. at 748.

4.

People v. Ford, 86 N.Y.2d 397, 402–03 (1995) (citing People v. Harris, 61 N.Y.2d 9, 19 (1983)).

5.

See id. at 403 (citing Fruchtman v. Kenton, 531 F.2d 946, 948 (9th Cir. 1976)).

6.

Id.

7.

Jenny Roberts, The Mythical Divide Between Collateral and Direct Consequences of Criminal Convictions:
Involuntary Commitment of “Sexually Violent Predators,” 93 Minn. L. Rev. 670, 672–75 (2008) (proposing
a reasonableness standard in determining the duty to inform about consequences rather than the
traditional collateral and direct consequences doctrine).

8.

People v. Harnett, 16 N.Y.3d 200, 206 (2011).

9.

See id. at 205.

10.

See generally Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1476 (2010) (finding deportation uniquely difficult to
classify as either direct or collateral because of its close connection to the criminal process).

750

VOLUME 56 | 2011/12

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

consequence of the defendant’s plea that fundamental fairness and due process
required the trial court to disclose it to the defendant before accepting his plea.11
II.	BACKGROUND

On March 13, 2008, in the County Court of Schenectady County, New York,
David Harnett pleaded guilty to sexual abuse in the first degree and was thereafter
convicted and sentenced to a prison term of seven years and ten years of post-release
supervision.12 On appeal to the Appellate Division, Third Department, Harnett
argued that his guilty plea was not knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily entered
because the County Court had failed to advise him that a guilty plea to a sex offense
would subject him to the provisions of SOMTA.13 In other words, Harnett maintained
that he was unaware that by pleading guilty to sexual abuse in the first degree he
could be subjected to confinement or an intensive supervision program beyond his
prison sentence.14
The Third Department, in deciding Harnett’s case, applied the well-settled New
York rule that a trial court is required to advise defendants of only direct, and not of
indirect, consequences prior to their pleading guilty.15 The court distinguished the
two consequences as follows: “Collateral consequences are peculiar to the individual
and generally result from the actions taken by agencies the court does not control [,
whereas a] direct consequence is one which has a definite, immediate, and largely
automatic effect on [a] defendant’s punishment.”16
SOMTA proceedings are extensive civil proceedings for individuals with sex
offense convictions,17 which the Third Department labeled as “entirely separate from
and independent of the original criminal action.”18 Upon a convicted sex offender’s
release from prison, SOMTA provides that the Office of Mental Health will conduct
a review and prepare a psychiatric report to determine whether the individual needs
civil management or has a mental abnormality.19 The defendant will then be evaluated
11.

See State v. Bellamy, 835 A.2d 1231, 1238 (N.J. 2003).

12.

People v. Harnett, 894 N.Y.S.2d 614, 615 (3d Dep’t 2010).

13.

Id.

14.

Id.

15.

Id.; see People v. Catu, 792 N.Y.S.2d 887, 888 (2005); People v. Ford, 86 N.Y.2d 397, 403 (1995).

16.

Harnett, 894 N.Y.S.2d at 615 (alterations in original) (quoting Catu, 792 N.Y.S.2d at 888).

17.

N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law § 10.03 (McKinney 2011).

18.

Harnett, 894 N.Y.S.2d at 615 (footnote omitted).

19.

See id.; N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law § 10.05 (McKinney 2011). The Office of Mental Health reviews all
relevant records, such as an offender’s rap sheet, his pre-sentence investigation report, Department of
Corrections files, and sex offender program results. This review is intended to determine the offender’s
level of dangerousness and whether any mental abnormality exists that would predispose him to commit
new sex crimes. See State v. Enrique T., No. 250306-11, 2011 WL 2201220 (Sup. Ct. Bronx Cnty. June
7, 2011); SOMTA/Civil Management DOCS Fact Sheet, Department of Corrections and
Community Supervision (Dec. 2007), http://www.docs.state.ny.us/FactSheets/PDF/somta.pdf.

751

People v. Harnett

in a series of civil hearings20 to determine whether further confinement or intensive
supervision is needed.21 Based on the multiple steps in SOMTA’s civil process, the
Third Department determined that civil confinement under the statute is not an
automatic result of a guilty plea to a sex offense. The court therefore concluded that
it was a collateral consequence under New York law and did not need to be disclosed
to Harnett before he entered a guilty plea.22
The dissent, however, found that, “as a matter of fundamental fairness,” a
defendant must be made aware of the possibility of civil confinement under SOMTA,
regardless of whether the consequence was found to be direct or collateral.23 The
dissent relied on the New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Bellamy, which
held that the decision to advise a defendant about a consequence should not depend
on its legal categorization, but should instead be based on whether its “impact is
devastating.” 24 In arguing for disclosure despite the “collateral” label, the dissent
disregarded New York’s formalistic distinction between direct and collateral
consequences and instead sought an outcome in line with the constitutional notion of
“fundamental fairness” and the protections of due process.25
20. Based on the review conducted by the Office of Mental Health, the Attorney General may petition to

seek civil management if probable cause that the offender is a threat to society can be established. The
case will then go before a jury who must agree with the Attorney General’s petition. Finally, a judge will
decide whether to place the individual in a secure treatment facility or under intensive supervision. See
SOMTA/Civil Management DOCS Fact Sheet, supra note 19.

21.

See Harnett, 894 N.Y.S.2d at 616; Mental Hyg. §§ 10.06–07. Civil confinement under SOMTA
consists of treatment in a secure Office of Mental Health facility. See 2009 N.Y. State Office of
Mental Health, 2009 Annual Report on the Implementation of Mental Hygiene Law
Article 10: Sex Offender Management and Treatment Act of 2007 18 (2010), http://www.
omh.state.ny.us/omhweb/statistics/SOMTA_Report.pdf. Those committed proceed through a fourstep treatment process that is designed to help them acquire healthy skills and habits in order to
ultimately re-enter civilization. See id. at 19–20. As of October 2009, 100 sex offenders had been deemed
dangerous sex offenders requiring confinement. Id. at 18. Not one offender has completed the four-step
process and been released. Id. at 20. The conditions of intensive supervision are extensive and often
include conditions such as global positioning satellite (GPS) tracking, polygraph monitoring,
specification of residence, prohibiting contact with identified past or potential victims, frequent sex
offender treatment sessions, curfew, and abstinence from alcohol. Id. at 16.

22.

Harnett, 894 N.Y.S.2d at 616.

23.

Id. at 617 (Stein, J., dissenting).

[A] trial court has the constitutional duty to ensure that a defendant, before pleading
guilty, has a full understanding of what the plea connotes and its consequences. Thus,
due process requires that the plea and the waiver of rights it necessarily encompasses
represent a knowing, voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of
action available to the defendant. . . . [W]e would find, as a matter of fundamental
fairness, that the possibility of civil commitment under SOMTA must be disclosed to a
defendant prior to his or her plea of guilty, regardless of whether such commitment is
considered to be a direct or penal consequence of the plea.

Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
24.

State v. Bellamy, 835 A.2d 1231, 1238 (N.J. 2003) (requiring trial courts to inform a defendant of civil
commitment under the New Jersey Sexually Violent Predator Act due to fundamental fairness).

25.

Harnett, 894 N.Y.S.2d at 617 (Stein, J. dissenting).
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On appeal to the New York Court of Appeals, Harnett first argued that SOMTA
consequences are direct and therefore require pre-plea disclosure. 26 However, a
majority of the court quickly dismissed this argument as “plainly without merit”
based on its precedents in People v. Ford and People v. Gravino.27 Specifically, the
court analogized SOMTA consequences to the possibility of deportation (Ford) and
the requirements of the Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) (Gravino), 28 both of
which the Court of Appeals had previously declared to be collateral consequences.29
Relying primarily on Bellamy, Harnett also argued that, regardless of whether
SOMTA consequences are direct or collateral, they are so severe that a lack of
disclosure renders plea proceedings fundamentally unfair. 30 The majority
acknowledged this as Harnett’s stronger argument, yet ultimately declined to adopt
it.31 Specifically, the court conceded that the facts of Bellamy indeed raised serious
issues of fundamental fairness, but only because the defendant in Bellamy was actually
committed to civil confinement under New Jersey’s equivalent of SOMTA.32 Harnett,
on the other hand, had not yet been committed, and the trial record was unclear as
to whether there was ever any significant likelihood that Harnett would be
committed.33 As a result, the majority found Bellamy inapplicable.34
In rendering its decision, the Court of Appeals also addressed its language from
People v. Gravino, in which it stated: “[t]here may be cases in which a defendant can
show he pleaded guilty in ignorance of a consequence that, although collateral for
purposes of due process, was of such great importance to him that he would have

26. People v. Harnett, 16 N.Y.3d 200, 203–04 (2011).
27.

Id.; see also People v. Gravino, 902 N.Y.3d 851, 852 (2010) (holding sex offender registration a collateral
consequence); People v. Ford, 86 N.Y.2d 397 (1995) (holding possible deportation a collateral consequence).

28. SORA requires convicted sex offenders to annually provide their identifying information, photo,

fingerprints, underlying crime, place of employment, and address of residence to local law enforcement.
N.Y. Correct. Law § 168b (McKinney 2008). Upon a change in this information, the individual is
responsible for notifying local law enforcement. See § 168f. The information can be placed on a regional
or national registry. See § 168b. Offenders are also ranked by the Board of Examiners of Sex Offenders
according to risk level, which is based on the severity of their underlying crimes. See § 168l. Depending
on this ranking, a sex offender will have to register for anywhere between twenty years to life. See §
168h. Defendants who are convicted of crimes defined under New York penal law as sex offenses or
other “sexually motivated” felonies are subject to both SORA and SOMTA. See generally § 168a; N.Y.
Mental Hyg. Law § 10.03 (McKinney 2010); N.Y. Penal Law § 130.00 et seq. Both SORA and
SOMTA are regulatory statutes and were designed to prevent future crimes, not to punish past crimes.
Harnett, 16 N.Y.3d at 206. Further, both statutes require important decisions and recommendations by
administrative agencies only after a guilty plea or trial. Id.

29. Harnett, 16 N.Y.3d at 206; Ford, 86 N.Y.2d at 403; Gravino, 902 N.Y.3d at 852.
30. Harnett, 16 N.Y.3d at 206.
31.

Id.

32.

Id.

33.

Id. at 207.

34. Id.
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made a different decision had that consequence been disclosed.”35 In these instances,
the court explained that a guilty plea would be rendered involuntary and could be
successfully withdrawn by the defendant. 36 However, the Court of Appeals found
this exception unavailable to Harnett because, in the eyes of the court, he had not
established a significant likelihood that he would actually be subject to civil
confinement under SOMTA.37 In doing so, the majority placed a heavy burden on
sex offenders subject to SOMTA 38 by requiring them to prove that civil confinement
under SOMTA is such a strong possibility that knowledge of the consequence would
have caused them to reject their plea bargain.39 Because Harnett did not meet this
burden, a majority of the Court of Appeals determined that withdrawal of his plea
was not justified, thereby affirming the Third Department’s decision.40
The dissent acknowledged the similarities between the statutes at issue in Gravino
(SORA) and Harnett (SOMTA) and did not dispute the majority’s classification of
SOMTA as a collateral consequence.41 Nonetheless, the dissent noted that, although
this consequence is neither punitive in nature nor applicable to every defendant, it
could result in a period of confinement that is longer than a defendant’s initial prison
sentence.42 Viewing this as a “grave deprivation of liberty,”43 the dissent maintained,
relying on Bellamy, that due process requires a defendant to understand the “full
extent of confinement that might result from his conviction.”44 Otherwise, a waiver
of the constitutional right to a trial will not be knowing and voluntary.45 Under this
analysis, the dissent concluded that due process required the court to notify Harnett
of the consequences of his plea arising under SOMTA.
III.	DISCUSSION

The New York Court of Appeals majority and dissent both correctly concluded
that the possibility of civil confinement under SOMTA does not neatly fit within the
definition of a direct consequence of a plea.46 However, upon closer examination, the
possibility of civil confinement under SOMTA does not entirely fit within the
definition of a collateral consequence either. Nevertheless, in strictly adhering to New
35.

Id. at 207 (quoting People v. Gravino, 14 N.Y.3d 546, 559 (2010)).

36. Gravino, 14 N.Y.3d at 559.
37.

Harnett, 16 N.Y.3d at 206.

38. Id. at 207.
39.

Id.

40. Id. at 208.
41.

Id. at 208 (Ciparick, J., dissenting).

42.

Id. at 209.

43.

Id. at 208.

44. Id. at 209.
45.

Id.

46. Id. at 205.
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York’s categorical approach, the Court of Appeals forced a collateral consequence label
on the possibility of civil confinement under SOMTA. In doing so, the court failed to
consider the special and severe consequences that may result from a guilty plea to a sex
offense.47 The court also ignored the U.S. Supreme Court’s disapproval of the categorical
approach in Padilla v. Kentucky, too quickly dismissed the constitutional concerns in
Bellamy, and failed to follow its own guidance in Gravino.48
This case comment contends that the Court of Appeals erred in applying New
York’s categorical rule to determine whether a court must inform a defendant of the
possibility of consequences under SOMTA prior to accepting a guilty plea to a sex
offense. First, SOMTA consequences are harsh and cannot be squarely classified as
either direct or collateral.49 As a result, the Court of Appeals should have found the
categorical approach inapplicable. Instead, to determine whether knowledge of civil
confinement under SOMTA was required, the court should have weighed the
severity of the consequence against the need for institutional efficiency.50 If it had
done so, the court should have concluded that civil confinement under SOMTA was
so severe that fundamental fairness and due process required its disclosure prior to
Harnett’s plea.51
A. SOMTA Cannot Be Squarely Classified as Direct or Collateral

Recently, the U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged the limitations of a direct/
collateral consequences categorical rule in Padilla v. Kentucky.52 In that case, the
Kentucky Supreme Court used a categorical approach in determining that the
defendant’s counsel had not been ineffective for failing to advise him that pleading
guilty to drug distribution charges would subject him to automatic deportation.53
During post-conviction proceedings, however, the Court declined to apply Kentucky’s
categorical rule in evaluating whether Padilla’s counsel was constitutionally ineffective
for failing to inform him of this consequence.54 The Court held that the categorical
rule was poorly tailored to determining the scope of counsel’s Sixth Amendment
obligations when the consequence at issue was “uniquely difficult to classify as either
a direct or a collateral consequence.”55
47.

See State v. Bellamy, 835 A.2d 1231, 1238 (N.J. 2003); People v. Harnett, 894 N.Y.S.2d 614, 617–18 (3d
Dep’t 2010) (Stein, J., dissenting).

48. See generally People v. Harnett, 16 N.Y.3d 200 (2011).
49. See generally Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1482 (2010) (holding the direct versus collateral

distinction ill-suited for a consequence that is uniquely difficult to classify).

50. See Bellamy, 835 A.2d at 1238–39; see also Roberts, supra note 7, at 720 (suggesting that severity should

be a central factor in determining constitutional criminal procedural rights).

51.

See Harnett, 894 N.Y.S.2d at 617 (Stein, J., dissenting); Bellamy, 835 A.2d at 1238.

52.

See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1473.

53.

Id. at 1478.

54. Id.
55.

Id. at 1482.
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In Padilla, the Court determined that deportation has long been recognized as a
severe “penalty,” despite the civil nature of removal proceedings.56 In addition, the
Court recognized that the progression of immigration law over the past century has
“enmeshed” deportation and criminal convictions, making deportation “intimately
related to the criminal process.”57 As a result, the Court concluded that classifying
deportation as either a direct or collateral consequence of a criminal conviction was
uniquely difficult and that Kentucky’s rigid categorical distinction was ill-suited to
evaluating an ineffective assistance of counsel claim concerning the specific risk of
deportation.58 Therefore, the Court declined to apply that approach and conducted
its Strickland test without labeling deportation as either a direct or collateral
consequence.59
Throughout its analysis in Padilla, the Supreme Court emphasized that a
defendant’s knowledge of possible deportation could only help both parties achieve
their interests in reaching plea agreements that comport with due process.60
Furthermore, the Court explained that a defendant’s informed consideration of
deportation would not open the floodgates to challenges of convictions obtained
through plea bargains.61 Specifically, the Court reasoned:
The nature of relief secured by a successful collateral challenge to a guilty
plea—an opportunity to withdraw the plea and proceed to trial—imposes its
own significant limiting principle: Those who collaterally attack their guilty
pleas lose the benefit of the bargain obtained as a result of the plea. Thus, a
different calculus informs whether it is wise to challenge a guilty plea in a
habeas proceeding because, ultimately, the challenge may result in a less
favorable outcome for the defendant, whereas a collateral challenge to a
conviction obtained after a jury trial has no similar downside potential.62

56. Id. at 1481.
57.

Id.

58. Id. at 1482.
59.

Id. at 1482; see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (establishing a two-pronged test to
determine whether counsel was constitutionally ineffective in representing the accused).

60. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1486.

Id.
61.

[I]n this case, a criminal episode may provide the basis for multiple charges, of which
only a subset mandate deportation following conviction. Counsel who possess the most
rudimentary understanding of the deportation consequences of a particular criminal
offense may be able to plea bargain creatively with the prosecutor in order to craft a
conviction and sentence that reduce the likelihood of deportation, as by avoiding a
conviction for an offense that automatically triggers the removal consequence. At the
same time, the threat of deportation may provide the defendant with a powerful
incentive to plead guilty to an offense that does not mandate that penalty in exchange
for a dismissal of a charge that does.

Id. at 1477.

62. Id. at 1485–86.
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In Harnett, the Court of Appeals should have applied the U.S. Supreme Court’s
analysis of deportation in Padilla to its own analysis of civil confinement under
SOMTA. In doing so, the Court of Appeals should have concluded that New York’s
categorical approach was ill suited for determining the validity of a guilty plea under
due process when the specific risk of civil confinement is involved.
Civil confinement under SOMTA, like deportation in Padilla, is neither a squarely
direct nor a squarely collateral consequence of a guilty plea to a sex offense. In
classifying a consequence as either direct or collateral, the New York Court of Appeals
has considered the following factors: “the nexus between the entry of a guilty plea and
the consequence,” whether the consequence was “presumptively mandatory,” and
whether the resulting consequence is more “punitive or policy driven.”63 Typically,
immediate punishments resulting from the criminal justice system are considered
direct consequences.64 On the other hand, potential consequences that are civil in
nature and predicated on policy are considered collateral.65
The Court of Appeals correctly determined that the possibility of civil
confinement under SOMTA cannot be classified as a direct consequence.66 First, the
nexus between a guilty plea and civil confinement is too attenuated given the time
and civil process between them.67 The decision to confine a sexual offender comes
only after the individual has served the term of incarceration and has been evaluated
by administrative agencies and adjudicated in a series of civil proceedings.68 Further,
although commencement of SOMTA’s civil process is an automatic effect of a guilty
plea to a sex offense, there remains only the possibility of future civil confinement.69
Thus civil confinement is not definite or “presumptively mandatory.” 70
Civil confinement under SOMTA also cannot be squarely classified as a collateral
consequence. Civil confinement for convicted sex offenders under SOMTA is, on its
face, policy-driven.71 A system placing convicted, dangerous sex offenders in civil
confinement after they are released from prison protects our communities.72
63. People v. Duffy, 902 N.Y.S.2d 805, 808 (Sup. Ct. Nassau Cnty. 2010) (citing People v. Ford, 86 N.Y.2d

397 (1995)).

64. See id. at 808–10.
65.

Id.

66. People v. Harnett, 16 N.Y.3d 200, 205 (2011).
67.

See People v. Harnett, 894 N.Y.S.2d 614, 616 (3d Dep’t 2010). See generally N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law §§
10.05–07 (McKinney 2010) (requiring extensive civil proceedings to determine if an individual is a
dangerous sexual offender in need of civil confinement).

68. See Harnett, 894 N.Y.S.2d at 616. See generally N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law §§ 10.05–07 (McKinney

2010).

69. See Mental Hyg. §§ 10.01–03 (requiring only those sex offenders determined to be dangerous or

recidivist to be civilly confined).

70. People v. Duffy, 902 N.Y.S.2d 805, 808 (Sup. Ct. Nassau Cnty. 2010) (citing People v. Ford, 86 N.Y.2d

397 (1995)).

71.

See State v. Bellamy, 835 A.2d 1231, 1237 (N.J. 2003).

72. See Mental Hyg. § 10.01(d) (stating that one of the goals of SOMTA is to protect the public).
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Additionally, collateral consequences “generally result from the actions taken by
agencies the [criminal] court does not control.”73 Civil confinement under SOMTA
is decided and imposed by the Office of Mental Health, the Attorney General, and
the civil courts, none of which is an agency within the control of the criminal court
system.74 The foregoing characteristics of the SOMTA consequences tend to weigh
in favor of a collateral classification. Nonetheless, SOMTA consequences can be
seen as punitive, especially in the eyes of a defendant; “[t]he person who finds himself
securely locked up and designated as a sexual violent predator will experience it as
quite similar to incarceration, and therefore punishment.” 75 And confinement,
whether coming from the criminal or civil process, is still imprisonment and has a
decidedly punitive impact.76 The punitive feel that attaches to SOMTA consequences
is similar to the punitive nature of deportation recognized by the Supreme Court in
Padilla; in both instances the notion that the consequence is completely collateral is
blurred.77
Additionally, federal circuit courts of appeal have determined that the following
consequences are collateral: loss of the right to vote or travel abroad, loss of civil
service employment, loss of a driver’s license, and undesirable discharge from the
armed services.78 Although the application of any one of these consequences may
affect the livelihood of a defendant, none would significantly affect the physical
liberty of a defendant.79 To the contrary, civil confinement under SOMTA is a
combination of “incarceration and exile” resulting in the complete deprivation of
physical liberty.80 This fact weighs against a collateral classification. Clearly,
73. People v. Ford, 86 N.Y.2d 397, 403 (1995).
74.

See Mental Hyg. §§ 10.05–07.

75. Roberts, supra note 7, at 708–09.
76. See id. at 708.
77.

See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1481 (2010) (“[W]e find it ‘most difficult’ to divorce the
penalty from the conviction in the deportation context.”).

78. See Ford, 86 N.Y.2d at 403; see also Meaton v. United States, 328 F.2d 379, 381 (5th Cir. 1964) (holding

the loss of civil rights as collateral effect of a plea); United States v. Crowley, 529 F.2d 1066, 1072 (3d
Cir. 1976) (holding the loss of civil service employment as a collateral consequence); Moore v. Hinton,
513 F.2d 781, 782–83 (5th Cir. 1975) (holding loss of driver’s license a collateral consequence); Redwine
v. Zuckert, 317 F.2d 336, 338 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (holding undesirable discharge from armed services a
collateral consequence).

79. See People v. Harnett, 894 N.Y.S.2d 614, 616 (3d Dep’t 2010) (Stein, J., dissenting) (noting that civil

confinement is a “potentially greater deprivation of liberty than the criminal sentence imposed upon
most defendants” and other consequences previsouly deemed collateral).

80. Roberts, supra note 7, at 708; see State v. Bellamy, 835 A.2d 1231, 1238 (N.J. 2003).

[Civil] [c]onfinement under [SOMTA] is theoretically without end. In that sense, it
constitutes a greater deprivation than that imposed upon a criminal defendant who, in
all but a handful of cases, is given a maximum release date. A more onerous impairment
of a person’s liberty interest is difficult to imagine.

Id. at 1238 (quoting In re Civil Commitment of D.L., 797 A.2d 166, 173 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002)).
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attempting to categorize SOMTA consequences as either direct or collateral brings
to light the problems inherent in a rigid categorical system.81
B. Efficiency and Finality vs. Constitutional Rights

To be clear, a categorical rule that distinguishes between direct and collateral
consequences can be an effective tool for courts and should not be completely
eliminated,82 despite the suggestion of the Third Department’s dissent.83 Given the
high volume of guilty pleas in our criminal justice system, this well-settled approach
promotes efficiency and finality.84 To require a judge to inform a defendant of all
anticipated “multifarious peripheral contingencies which may affect the defendant’s
civil liabilities, his eligibility for a variety of societal benefits, his civil rights or his
right to remain in this country”85 would undermine the institutional values of speed
and economy.86 The direct/collateral distinction limits the number of warnings a
court must give to a defendant pre-trial, thereby lessening the chance of a successful
post-conviction attack based on a failure to warn claim.87 The categorical rule also
helps control the volume of judicial work and promotes an orderly administration of
justice through guilty pleas.88
However, the Court of Appeals decision in Harnett appears to value the benefits
of New York’s categorical rule over the constitutional rights of the defendant. As
stated above, due process requires pleas to be knowing and voluntary. This honors
the gravity of waiving one’s right against self-incrimination, right to trial by a jury,
and right to confront one’s accusers.89 By allowing Harnett to plead guilty without
knowing the full extent of his possible confinement, the court disregarded the
81.

See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1481–82 (2010).

82. See Roberts, supra note 7, at 672–73 (discussing how circumscribing to the categorical approach benefits

judicial economy).

83. See Harnett, 894 N.Y.S.2d at 618 (Stein, J., dissenting).
84. See Roberts, supra note 7, at 735 (“Indeed, guilty pleas in the past several decades have risen even from

their previously high levels, now constituting upwards of ninety-nine percent of convictions in some
jurisdictions. The courts, and many commentators, have opined that the criminal justice system would
grind to a halt, or even crumble, without plea bargaining.”).

85. Michel v. United States, 507 F.2d 461, 466 (2d Cir. 1974) (holding that trial courts do not have an

obligation to inform defendants of possible deportation upon pleading guilty because they cannot be
required to “draw up a complete list of possible consequences . . . [and] determine the degree of
probability of their happening”).

86. See United States v. Wiggins, 905 F.2d 51, 54 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding that to allow a defendant to

appeal the very sentence he agreed to, after he expressly waived the statutory right to raise objections to
the sentence, is contrary to the “chief virtues of the plea system—speed, economy, and finality” (quoting
Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 (1977))).

87.

Roberts, supra note 7, at 672–73.

88. See United States v. Smith, 440 F.2d 521, 528 (7th Cir. 1971) (suggesting that procedures which decrease

the concept of finality increase the volume of judicial work and impair the administration of justice).

89. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969).
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principle that “[f]reedom from bodily restraint is at the core of the liberty protected
by the Due Process Clause . . . .” 90
Additionally, by not requiring disclosure of the possibility of civil confinement
under SOMTA, the court is promoting silence on behalf of judges who preside over
the pleas of sex offenders.91 If judges provide misinformation to a defendant, their
decisions run the risk of being reversed.92 On the other hand, if they remain tightlipped regarding SOMTA, they not only protect their decisions from reversal, but
also avoid any delay in the plea process that might be caused by a defendant’s
consideration of civil confinement.93 In the interest of finality, judges are incentivized
to remain silent about SOMTA.94
C. Due Process and Fundamental Fairness Warrant the Disclosure of SOMTA

If the Court of Appeals had followed its own precedent in Gravino and utilized
the reasoning set forth in Padilla and Bellamy, the dictates of due process and
fundamental fairness would have been faithfully served. Instead, the court in Harnett
forced a collateral label on civil confinement under SOMTA by analogizing the
consequence to sex offender registration under SORA, which had previously been
deemed collateral in Gravino.95 SOMTA, like SORA, is remedial, controlled by
agencies after a plea is entered, and is therefore not automatic.96 Additionally, a larger
percentage of sex offenders are ultimately subject to SORA’s registration requirements
than SOMTA’s harsh consequences.97 However, in labeling SOMTA consequences
“collateral,” the Court of Appeals ignored a critical difference between SORA and
SOMTA: SORA cannot result in civil confinement for life, while SOMTA can. The
fact that a smaller percentage of sex offenders are subject to civil confinement under
SOMTA does not minimize the seriousness of this consequence to a conviction for a
sex offense.98
The Court of Appeals also compared the possibility of deportation, which it had
previously deemed collateral, to civil confinement under SOMTA in an attempt to
90. People v. Harnett, 16 N.Y.3d 200, 209 (2011) (Ciparick, J., dissenting) (quoting Foucha v. Lousiana,

504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992)).

91.

See Jenny Roberts, Ignorance is Effectively Bliss: Collateral Consequences, Silence, and Misinformation in the
Guilty Plea Process, 95 Iowa L. Rev. 119, 121 (2009) (arguing that the collateral consequences rule and
the affirmative misadvice exception create “a perverse incentive structure” that promotes silence on
behalf of defense attorneys, prosecutors, and judges).

92.

Id. at 140–41; see also State v. Bellamy, 835 A.2d 1231, 1235 (2003) (“A defendant has the right not to
be ‘misinformed’ about a material element of a plea agreement and to have his or her ‘reasonable
expectations’ fulfilled.”).

93.

Roberts, supra note 91, at 141.

94. Id.
95. Harnett, 16 N.Y.3d at 206.
96. Id.
97.

Id.

98. Id. at 210 (Ciparick, J., dissenting).
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drive home the point that it, too, is collateral.99 However, in doing so, the court
failed to give weight to the Supreme Court’s characterization of deportation as “a
particularly severe ‘penalty’” that is the “equivalent of banishment or exile.”100 Had
the court adopted this view of deportation and recognized that it shared the same
severe, punishment-like qualities as civil confinement, a comparison of deportation
and civil confinement would have led to the same determination as in Padilla.
Specifically, the Court of Appeals would have found that civil confinement, just like
deportation, was “uniquely difficult” to classify as direct or collateral, and thus use of
New York’s categorical rule was inappropriate in assessing whether Harnett’s guilty
plea was knowing and voluntary.
Although use of a categorical approach promotes the institutional interests of
efficiency and finality, these interests are not of the same constitutional caliber as the
Fifth and Sixth Amendment trial rights of a defendant.101 Therefore, a court must
only utilize a categorical approach based on formalistic distinctions up to the point
where due process requires a defendant’s knowledge of a consequence that would
significantly affect the defendant’s decision to plead guilty.102 As the New Jersey
Supreme Court emphasized in Bellamy,
[w]e continue to stress the necessity of determining whether a consequence is
direct or penal when analyzing whether a defendant must be informed of a
particular consequence. However, when the consequence of a plea may be so
severe that a defendant may be confined for the remainder of his or her life,
fundamental fairness demands that the trial court inform [the] defendant of
that possible consequence.103

The Court of Appeals’ dismissal of Bellamy as relevant guidance is erroneous. In
Bellamy, the defendant pled guilty to a sex crime and, one week before his release
proceedings began, application of the New Jersey Sexually Violent Predator Act
resulted in his further commitment.104 The Court of Appeals honed in on the fact
that Bellamy was actually committed under the New Jersey statute and, accordingly,
distinguished his situation from that of Harnett, who had not been committed nor—
according to the Court of Appeals—made a showing that he realistically could be
committed.105 Although this is a notable distinction between the cases, it does not
make the Bellamy court’s analysis inapplicable to Harnett. To the contrary, Bellamy
serves as a good example of the serious problems that can result from the application
99. Id. at 206.
100. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1481, 1486 (2010).
101. See Roberts, supra note 7, at 740 (noting that “finality and efficiency are legitimate concerns” but not of

a “constitutional dimension”).

102. See generally North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31 (1970) (finding that due process requires a plea

to represent “a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the
defendant”).

103. State v. Bellamy, 835 A.2d 1231, 1238–39 (N.J. 2003).
104. Id. at 1234–35.
105. People v. Harnett, 16 N.Y.3d 200, 208 (2011).
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of a categorical approach and of the need to comport with fundamental fairness,
especially where civil confinement is concerned.106 As the New Jersey Supreme Court
sympathized, “[a] more onerous impairment of a person’s liberty interest is difficult
to imagine.”107 The court therefore held that trial courts must ensure that defendants
accepting a plea to a sex offense understand that, as a result of their plea, “there is the
possibility of future commitment,” otherwise the plea would not be knowing and
voluntary.108 Accordingly, the court remanded Bellamy’s case to permit him to move
to withdraw his plea.109 Similarly, the potential for civil confinement under SOMTA,
given its severity, is information that should have been made known to Harnett by
the trial court in order for his plea to be valid under the Due Process Clause.110
The Court of Appeals previously accepted this theory in Gravino: “[I]n the vast
majority of plea bargains the overwhelming consideration for the defendant is
whether he will be imprisoned and for how long.” 111 By ignoring this interest,
however, the court eliminated Harnett as the key player in the plea bargaining
process.112 The whole concept of plea bargaining is premised upon the knowing
waiver of the defendant’s rights.113 Thus, in order to satisfy due process, a guilty plea
can only be entered after a plea colloquy, during which the trial court engages the
defendant in a dialogue regarding his intention to plea. “What is at stake for an
accused facing . . . imprisonment demands the utmost solicitude of which courts are
capable in canvassing the matter with the accused to make sure he has a full
understanding of what the plea connotes and of its consequence.”114 By not informing
Harnett of potential SOMTA consequences, the court left him ignorant of
information that Gravino acknowledged to be most important to a defendant—the
potential length of his full term of confinement. This undermines the integrity of
plea bargains, which are supposed to revolve around the knowing waiver of the
defendant’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment trial rights.
In Gravino, the Court of Appeals determined that the requirements of SORA
were collateral consequences.115 Additionally, the court suggested an exception to
New York’s categorical rule for those cases where a defendant can show that a
106. See Roberts, supra note 7, at 726 (suggesting that a reasonable defendant would place significant weight

on the possibility of lifelong involuntary commitment during the decisionmaking process).

107. Bellamy, 835 A.2d at 1238 (alteration in original) (quoting In re Civil Commitment of D.L., 797 A.2d

166, 173 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002)).

108. Id. at 1238–39.
109. Id. at 1239.
110. See id.
111. People v. Gravino, 14 N.Y.3d 546, 559 (2010).
112. See Roberts, supra note 7, at 713–14 (arguing that the defendant’s perspective is what gives meaning to a

voluntary and knowing plea).

113. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969).
114. Id. at 243–44 (emphasis added).
115. Gravino, 14 N.Y.3d at 559.
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particular consequence is of such great importance that knowledge of it at the time
of the defendant’s plea would have caused him not to enter a plea.116 Here, the Court
of Appeals should have looked to this exception and determined that disclosure of
the possibility of civil confinement under SOMTA was necessary to create a valid
guilty plea under due process, especially given the inherent difficulty in classifying
the consequence.117
Instead, the Court of Appeals ignored its prior case law and imposed a heavy
burden on defendants who might become subject to SOMTA: “[I]f a defendant can
show that the prospect of SOMTA confinement was realistic enough that it reasonably
could have caused him, and in fact would have caused him, to reject an otherwise
acceptable plea bargain,” then a plea can be found involuntary.118 Clearly, by placing
a higher burden on Harnett than Gravino requires, the court is establishing a
preference in New York for the benefits of the formalistic rule over the constitutional
demands of due process.119 Regardless of Harnett’s chances of being confined under
SOMTA, his lack of knowledge and consideration of the consequence undermines
the notion of fairness and legitimacy in his guilty plea.120 The mere possibility of
confinement alone should be enough to require disclosure.121 Against the dictates of
due process, the Court of Appeals’ decision sanctions a court’s acceptance of the
ignorance of sex offenders when pleading guilty.122
Applying this additional disclosure obligation where severe consequences cannot
be squarely classified as either direct or collateral will not place a heavy burden on trial
courts because such circumstances are rare.123 Furthermore, trial courts are generally
aware of SOMTA, and taking a moment to educate the defendant will not significantly
impair the court’s efficiency.124 It may even promote judicial economy, as a greater
number of knowing pleas could result in fewer post-conviction challenges.125
Significantly, the Court of Appeals, despite its conclusion in Harnett, expressly
encouraged trial courts to inform defendants of the consequences of SOMTA.126
116. Id.
117. See id.
118. People v. Harnett, 16 N.Y.3d 200, 207 (2011).
119. Roberts, supra note 7, at 735.
120. See People v. Harnett, 894 N.Y.S.2d 614, 618 (3d Dep’t 2010) (Stein, J., dissenting).
121. See Harnett, 16 N.Y.3d at 209 (Ciparick, J., dissenting) (“I believe a defendant cannot be said to

knowingly and voluntarily forgo his right to trial if he does not know the full extent of confinement that
might result from his conviction.”).

122. See Roberts, supra note 7, at 735 (claiming the categorical approach promotes defendant ignorance and

is indifferent to its effect on the defendant).

123. People v. Gravino, 14 N.Y.3d 546, 559 (2010).
124. See Harnett, 894 N.Y.S.2d at 618 (Stein, J., dissenting).
125. See generally Roberts, supra note 7, at 737 (suggesting that a reasonableness standard, which would

ensure front-end warnings by the court, would lead to more knowing pleas).

126. Harnett, 16 N.Y.3d at 207.

763

People v. Harnett
IV. CONCLUSION

The Court of Appeals erred by applying New York’s categorical rule in a case
involving a unique and severe consequence of a plea agreement. Such consequences,
when they walk the fine line between a direct and collateral label, require the
consideration of fundamental fairness and due process. Otherwise, consequences
that entail grave impairments to life and liberty may go undisclosed and, as a result,
unconsidered by a defendant who is contemplating a guilty plea, thereby allowing
him to waive his Fifth and Sixth Amendment trial rights without the protections of
due process. In rendering its decision in Harnett, the Court of Appeals diluted the
meaning of knowledge under due process, and it has shaken the integrity of the most
integral mechanism of our criminal justice system: plea bargaining.127 This will cause
more defendants, and not just sex offenders, to waive their Fifth and Sixth
Amendment trial rights in ignorance of the harsh consequences that await them.

127. See Roberts, supra note 7, at 735 (“The courts, and many commentators, have opined that the criminal

justice system would grind to a halt, or even crumble, without plea bargaining.”); Santobello v. New
York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 (1971) (“Disposition of charges after plea discussions is not only an essential
part of the process but a highly desirable part for many reasons.”).
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